But routine did not mean insignificance, said analysts.
For Moscow, the visit reaffirmed access to China’s markets and political support. For Beijing, it reinforced a partnership that helps diversify energy supplies and counterbalance US pressure.
The visits showed “whether by coincidence or design” that China has options and can maintain good relations with both Washington and Moscow, said Dylan Loh, an associate professor at Nanyang Technological University’s School of Social Sciences.
“They are not mutually exclusive,” he said.
G2, TRIANGULAR OR MULTIPOLAR ORDER?
Beyond Trump and Putin, a series of leaders – particularly from Europe – have also visited Beijing, creating the optics of multiple countries courting China, Loh added.
For Ivanov, the visits reinforced China’s image as a major power whose engagement is sought by rivals, partners and hedging states alike.
To Washington, the message was that Beijing has other strategic options; to Moscow, it was that Russia remains central to China’s wider diplomatic architecture, he said.
China and Russia also sought to put that message in broader ideological terms. In a joint statement released during Putin’s visit, both sides called for a more multipolar world order and criticised what they cast as unilateralism and bloc confrontation.
That language was in keeping with Beijing and Moscow’s long-running push to present themselves as defenders of a world order less dominated by the US and its allies.
Analysts asserted that Beijing does not want to be locked into a US-China “G2”, even if Trump appears drawn to leader-level bargaining between the world’s two largest economies.
“I do not think China places too much weight (on) the idea of a G2,” said Loh.
“Their declared policy has always been one of a multipolar order,” he added.
Li Yaqi, a research assistant specialising in international relations at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, said the picture is more complicated than a simple yes or no.
An institutional G2 – where the US and China coordinate global governance on issues such as financial stability, climate, pandemics and public goods – is “not what is emerging”, he said.
“Trump likes G2 language because it gives him dealmaking flexibility and personal control,” he said.
Beijing, however, rejects the term because it does not want to be seen as entering a great-power condominium with Washington, Li added.
That would risk creating expectations that China should share the burden of managing global order, while also unsettling the Global South.
What looks more plausible is a thinner, more transactional form of G2, built around leader-level bargaining, selective crisis management and limited restraint in some areas, Li said.
