ENERGY SECURITY ABOVE ALL
Energy security above other calculations guides China’s strategic outlook. China needs both Russian and Iranian crude oil, which go for discounted prices below global benchmarks. Russia supplies a far bigger percentage of China’s demand at around 20 per cent compared to Iran’s 14 per cent.
But if China ever stopped buying Russian or Iranian oil, its competitors such as India may start snapping it up at reduced prices. So the trade-off for using its leverage in oil imports would not make sense.
So long as China’s economic relations with Russia prosper – and so long as China can extract favourable terms of trade from Russia without humiliating Mr Putin – Beijing has little incentive to pressure Russia into ending its war in Ukraine.
The war in the Middle East however is a bigger irritant for Beijing. As well as buying Iranian oil, it also imports crude from Saudi Arabia, all of which is being disrupted by the closure of seaborne routes. If the US wants China to become more engaged in the peace process, Washington will need to make progress through Pakistani mediation.
The underlying story of China’s growing role in international affairs remains one of latent power. Having manoeuvred itself into such a central global position by dint of its stature and its relative restraint, China seems content to sit back and watch as its friends and its rivals commit geopolitical blunders.
But how long before this latent influence starts to translate into more direct action? As the economic and strategic costs of global instability mount, Beijing could eventually find itself under pressure to wield its influence more directly.
Dr Samir Puri is Visiting Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London. His books include The Great Imperial Hangover and Westlessness.
